India’s Perception and Misperception of China-led Developmentalist Paradigms: Making Sense of India’s Attitude Towards China’s Belt and Road Initiative by Hielscher, Lisa
!
!
!
!
!
India’s Perception and Misperception of China-led 
Developmentalist Paradigms: Making Sense of 
India’s Attitude Towards China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative 
!
Supervisor: Dr. Jue Wang 
Second reader: Dr. Mohammadbagher Forough 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Lisa Hielscher 
MA Asia Studies 120 EC 
Summer semester 2017 
s1741950 
lisahielscher@yahoo.de 
Word count: 14.612 !
!
!!
Table of Contents !
!
1 Introduction 3 .......................................................................................................................................
2 China and India: Asymmetric Partners 10 ...........................................................................................
3 The Emergence of India’s Perception and Misperception 14 ..............................................................
3.1 Historical Memory 16 ...................................................................................................................
3.2 Day-to-Day Interaction 23 ............................................................................................................
3.3 Economic Relationship 29 ............................................................................................................
4 India’s Perception and Misperception of the Belt & Road  34 ............................................................
4.1 Geoeconomic Considerations 36 ..................................................................................................
4.2 Geopolitical Considerations  40 ....................................................................................................
 5 Conclusion 48 .....................................................................................................................................
6 Bibliography 52....................................................................................................................................
!  1
!
II 
Abstract 
!
This paper is aimed at two interrelated objectives. Firstly, it explores the shaping of India’s 
perception and misperception of China using the asymmetry theory. Secondly, it relates these 
insights to India’s behavior towards China-led developmentalism, the Belt & Road initiative, 
showing that India’s reluctance to be part of China’s initiative is rooted in mistrust, 
misinterpretations of information, and a lack of information. Ever since the deterioration of the 
Sino-Indian relationship due to the border war, India has established a deep-rooted distrust of 
China, which affects how new information regarding China is evaluated. It is therefore likely that 
misperceptions emerge. The asymmetric relationship between China and India amplifies the 
misinterpretation of information due to the vast difference in attention span. Further reasons for the 
emerging of misperceptions can be seen in historical memory and a lack of day-to-day interaction. 
!
Keywords: China, India, Belt & Road, Sino-Indian relations, developmentalism, asymmetry theory 
!
!  2
!
1 Introduction 
!
The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), also commonly 
referred to as the Belt and Road initiative (B&R), is China’s ambitious program of enhancing large-
scale cooperation with its neighboring regions. China’s development proposal cannot be understood 
as a fixed plan, but as an ongoing process. Although much has been said and written about the 
initiative since its announcement in 2013, a certain degree of vagueness still remains, which is at 
least partially due to the initiative’s work-in-progress character. The initiative’s vagueness translates 
into a variety of competing interpretations and understandings which create a favorable setting for 
wrong conclusions and misperceptions. 
In order to underline the open and inclusive nature of the project, the Chinese government 
has welcomed scholars, think tanks, and universities from all around the world to contribute their 
ideas and suggestions for the B&R. While the number of plans and ideas is huge, there remains a lot 
of disagreement and uncertainty on what the B&R should achieve, exactly, and how it should be 
used. Some Chinese scholars themselves have criticized the fact that, as of yet, there is no coherent 
understanding of the true aim of the project.  So far, the initiative provides various aims, but they 1
are not explicitly defined yet and leave room for interpretations. This vagueness, which some 
scholars suggest hides the true intention of the B&R, leaves nations reluctant to show all too much 
excitement. India is no exception to this. Despite the fact that China has already allocated India a 
role within the B&R, India has still not expressed its full support. Although the most comprehensive 
and precise outline until now, Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 
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 François Godement, "‘One Belt, One Road’: China’s great leap outward," ECFR.EU, June 10, 2015, accessed May 19, 1
2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/one_belt_one_road_chinas_great_leap_outward3055.
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,  released in 2015, repeatedly emphasizes the inclusive and 2
mutually beneficial character of the initiative, India is having a hard time understanding, let alone 
trusting this China-led developmentalist paradigm. India’s hesitant attitude reflects its general 
attitude towards China: caution. 
This paper argues that India’s cautious China strategy reflects misinformation and 
misinterpretation. There is clearly a lack of understanding between India and China; even Indian 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi pointed out, during his China visit in 2015, that “Indians and 
Chinese don’t know each other well, much less understand each other.”  In addition, this paper 3
argues that this lack of understanding results in distrust in the relationship, and that this distrust 
leads to India’s cautious behavior towards the B&R. But where does this lack of understanding 
emerge from? This paper outlines the asymmetric features of Sino-Indian relations and how 
structural misperceptions lead to the inability to relate to each other, hindering a deeper 
engagement. Three dominant factors contributing to India’s general perception and misperception 
of China are introduced: historic memory, lack of day-to-day interaction, and the economic 
relationship between the two nations. All three factors reveal the asymmetry of the Sino-Indian 
relationship, which, since its revival, has been a mixture of competition and cooperation. Now that 
the B&R factor has been added, its impact on the complicated relationship nexus is yet to be 
understood. 
 As early as 2002, John Garver points out, in his paper “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese 
Threat Perceptions”, that the asymmetric perceptions of mutual threat are a characteristic of Sino-
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 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road 2
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India relations.  Garver explains this phenomenon through China’s public media and its role in the 4
political system, and secondly through the measurement of the status quo, which is acceptable for 
China, but not for India.  Garver understands that the Sino-Indian relationship is shaped by the 5
asymmetry of perception and misperception. Although many of Garver’s findings cannot be called 
outdated, the B&R factor must be taken into account in order to understand present Sino-Indian 
relations. Furthermore, Garver’s focus lies on the role of the media in the creation of threat 
perception, which certainly is an important factor, but not the sole one.  
This paper hopes to gain a deeper understanding of the perceptions and misperceptions 
within the Sino-Indian relationship, specifically in the context of the B&R, by incorporating the 
framework of Brantly Womack’s asymmetric theory into the discussion. Applying this asymmetry 
framework will help to understand reactions coming from India and to analyze them in order to gain 
insight in India’s possible role within the B&R. Asymmetry theory, unlike theories of realism and 
neo-realism, does not assume that the more powerful side can force their will onto the less powerful 
side. While Womack places his concept of asymmetric relationships in a variety of contexts, 
including unipolarity, multipolarity, strategic triangles, civilizational clashes, and power transition, 
he has not used his research to consolidate or further develop his idea of asymmetry in inter-state 
relations and how this affects state behavior. This paper aims to fill this gap by applying Womack’s 
asymmetry theory in an inter-state scenario, in order to gain a deeper understanding of Indian 
thinkers’ own perception and misperception of Sino-Indian relations. In addition, mainstream 
international relations theory, for the most part, does not acknowledge the influence of perception 
and misperception on policy decisions, nor does it try to understand perception and misperception. 
Asymmetry theory therefore offers a more comprehensive approach, since it is not only open to 
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understanding perception and misperception, but also tries to explain situations which are favorable 
for the emerging of such. Furthermore, asymmetry theory acknowledges asymmetric relationships, 
which most states find themselves in. The asymmetry theory so far has not gained much attention, 
and it has rarely been used to explain state behavior. The theory provides us with a framework on 
how misperception between nations of unequal terms emerge, and thus it is a suitable approach to 
explain India’s hesitant behavior towards China-led B&R. 
!
In order to structurally break down and evaluate the Sino-Indian relationship, this paper will 
consider the factors of this relationship in the subsequent paragraphs.  
!
As pointed out by Chinese scholars, reactions towards the B&R from Indian strategic thinkers can 
be seen as a sit and wait process until more understanding and clarity about China’s intentions is 
gained.  However, as the understanding of China’s intentions is tinted by India’s perception and 6
misperception, it is less a sit and wait process for better understanding, and more a sit and wait for 
India’s decision-makers’ interpretation of China’s intentions. It is important to understand how 
Indian thinkers comprehend China’s actions, since they strongly influence India’s answers to China-
led developmentalism. The literature outlines that India sees the B&R project as a hegemonic 
project with Chinese dominance.  Should we understand India’s cautious B&R behavior as resulting 7
from misinterpretation of information, or are the concerns backed by realistic implications?  
 In his paper “The hedging prong in India’s evolving China strategy”, Hoo Tiang Boon 
analyses India’s threat perceptions of China in order to get a better understanding of India’s hedging 
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 Harsh Pant, "Evolving balance of power in the Asia-Pacific and India´s changing role," in Power transition in Asia, ed. 7
David Walton and Emilian Kavalski (London: Routledge, 2017).
behavior.  Boon highlights that a growing Chinese presence in South Asia is becoming a more 8
dominant factor in the Indian threat perception. Although Boon outlines the primary sources of 
India’s current threat perception towards China, the analysis is limited to perception and does not 
take India’s misperception into account. Furthermore, Boon highlights that a growing Chinese 
presence in South Asia is becoming a more dominant factor in the Indian threat perception, and 
calls for more discussion on this topic. This paper will expand on Boon’s discussion by considering 
India’s perception as well as its misperception; it seeks a deeper understanding of the Sino-Indian 
relationship by not limiting itself to the perception of threat.  
Perceptions toward major powers from both the public and elites can function as a base on 
which a country’s foreign policy can be formulated. Robert Jervis, who provided a foundation in 
perception studies in his book Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976), 
explains how perception and misperception influence political decision-making. It has to be 
acknowledged: perception matters. People's perception, as well as perception in general, has a high 
relevance for the balance of power within a region, as well as for the power within each country. 
Although perceptions are difficult to measure, international opinion polls of elite and public views 
can help to identify current trends.  Perception and misperception are both the result of interactions 9
between different parts of information, which joined together create a picture. Once, from the 
available definitions of a situation, a wrong one has been chosen, the foundation for 
misinterpretations has been laid. Perceptions have been transformed into misperceptions.  10
Misperception is the gap between an objective environment and the person’s subjective 
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understanding of that environment. This paper seeks to answer what differences perception and 
misperception can make for the Indian participation in B&R, China’s grand strategy initiative, and 
how these perceptions emerged. 
As David Walton points out in his introduction to Power Transition in Asia, “To be sure, the 
focus on great power relationships is to be expected. Nonetheless, there is a paucity of material 
focusing on how small and middle power nations are dealing with the substantial changes in the 
region.”  Therefore, it should come as no surprise that most of the work on responses to the B&R 11
on a larger scale focus on the U.S. response to it. An in-depth analysis of the impact of the B&R on 
China’s relationship with a regional power, whose sphere of influence is foreseen for activities on 
the basis of the B&R, is insufficient. This paper assists in making sense of the reactions coming 
from India. It thereby aims to draw India’s misperceptions and the reality closer together, and to 
help understand the gap between the objective environment of the B&R and Indian observers’ 
understanding of it. An extensive literature review, document analysis of speeches, reports, and 
surveys are used to gain a better understanding. 
One of the most significant features of the Sino-Indian relationship is the varied attention 
given to each other, and to each other’s actions. The asymmetry of power, as described by 
Womack’s asymmetry theory, creates a distorted perception on the one hand, while on the other 
hand producing a characteristic perspective of the more vulnerable smaller state’s anxious over-
interpretations, and of the larger state’s tendency to give its attention preferably to larger regional 
and global concerns, as attention affects the behavior of both states.  12
In chapter 2, the structure of China and India’s asymmetric relationship will be elaborated 
on, and asymmetry theory will be introduced in more detail. Chapter 3 will turn towards India’s 
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perceptions and misperceptions of China and analyze these in order to gain a better understanding 
of India’s reactions to China-led developmentalism. After gaining an understanding of the nature of 
the asymmetric relationship between the two countries – which is driven by India’s perception and 
misperception, impacting their cooperation – and the factors influencing it, chapter 4 will analyze 
India’s B&R understanding. By outlining two main considerations – geoeconomic and geopolitical 
– Indian attitudes towards the B&R are analyzed. Subsequently, this paper will analyze the B&R 
activities in South Asia and in India, and their impact on India in particular. India’s perceptions and 
misperceptions about the B&R are discussed in order to bring them closer to the actual reality of the 
B&R, and the final chapter concludes with possible future reactions towards the B&R. 
!
!
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!
2 China and India: Asymmetric Partners 
!
In the early 2000s, the scholar John Garver was among the first to delve into the asymmetrical 
feature that makes the Sino-Indian relationship so distinguishable. Although his findings are 
insightful, by applying the asymmetric theory drawn up by Womack, which provides a theoretical 
framework for the problems lying within the Sino-Indian relationship, a deeper understanding of the 
roots and causes of perception and misperception within this relationship can be gained. The central 
question of this paper is whether India’s perception and misperception shapes the relationship 
between China and India, and vice versa. 
One of the most significant features of the Sino-Indian relationship is the varied attention 
span the countries give each other and each other's actions. This varied attention span can be 
explained using asymmetry theory. The asymmetry of power leads the smaller state to perceive any 
actions taken by the larger state as an immediate threat directed towards itself; “Attention affects 
behavior”.  13
Asymmetry theory is based on the understanding that disparity in power and capacity 
creates a structural divergence of perception and misperception. This results in structural 
misperception of each other’s intentions, which can lead to mistrust and misunderstanding. 
Structural differences in perspective lead to structural differences in perception and misperception.  14
Western international relations theory likes to understand normal relations as either 
symmetric or hegemonic. The hegemonic relationship is characterized by managing and protecting 
the hegemony’s power, through which conflict can arise. The main focus here lies on great power, 
!  10
 Ibid, 4.13
 Ibid, 83.14
and on the possibility of war as an outcome of conflict. Whereas these are legitimate considerations, 
most relationships between states are marked by differences of capacities.  Western international 15
relations theory understands asymmetry as a peripheral factor, but disregards that most states are 
not great powers, but are in fact in asymmetric relationships with other states.    
In any relationship between two parties which differ in economic and military capabilities, 
as well as in population and general size, differences in opportunities and risks will emerge for each 
participant. Therefore, the larger side, to which the importance of the relationship is relatively small 
compared to its other bilateral engagements, will pay less attention to the relationship. For the 
smaller participant, the importance of the relationship is comparably larger, therefore its exposure to 
risk, as well as opportunities, is much greater. In addition, the smaller side has less control over the 
relationship. This leads to a disparity of attention for the relationship between two nations. Womack 
even goes as far as stating that an asymmetric relationship is not one relationship, “but rather two 
distinct sub-relations: that of A to B, and that of B to A.”  The distinction in two sub-relations is 16
important, as it emphasizes that the other side has a different understanding of the relationship in 
general, as well as a different understanding of the self-image of the counterpart. Differences in 
perspectives will naturally lead to differences in conclusions. Therefore, under-attention from the 
larger participant and over-attention from the smaller participant is likely. The larger side cannot 
appreciate the smaller side’s concerns, arising from its over-attentiveness, as the smaller side 
similarly cannot appreciate the larger side’s lack of coordination in policies towards itself. 
Asymmetry theory sees this imbalance between over- and under-attention as the major cause for 
structural misperception. 
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 Ibid, 5.15
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 The larger side seeks assurance that its status quo as a relative power is not being 
challenged. At the same time, the smaller side wishes for its identity and interests not to be 
threatened. Should the larger side try to maximize its advantages without paying attention to the 
smaller side’s interest, or even to the smaller side’s disadvantage, the smaller side will feel 
endangered and seek to counterbalance the aggressive behavior of the larger side.  Asymmetry 17
theory does not assume that the more powerful side can force their will onto the less powerful side. 
Therefore, the focus of asymmetry theory is on the real and continuing problems which occur 
during the course of an asymmetric relationship. While realism always has the possibility of war in 
mind, asymmetric theory sees war as a very unlikely outcome. Although exchanges between the 
two sides are not equal, they take place in a stable environment of international relationships, which 
means war is an unlikely outcome. 
Physical proximity makes asymmetry a stronger factor for neighboring states, given that 
distance often plays an important role in the definition of the general importance of a relationship. 
In our case, China is the larger participant in the bilateral relationship and India the smaller one. 
India is China’s second largest neighbor, China India’s largest. Due to their physical proximity, 
encounters in history were frequent, which created a historic memory of each other. Naturally, their 
geographical location is a factor that ignites perception and misperception. In this realm, asymmetry 
theory acknowledges the importance of history, context, and location when examining interstate 
relations.  Historical enmity can be a fixed source of perception and misperception, due to the fact 18
that the degree of enmity deriving from the same historical event has a high chance of remaining 
unchanged over time. If nations are physically near each other, the emerging of historical enmity is 
!  12
 Ibid, 274.17
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more likely, since a closeness in location increases the likelihood of encounters.  Naturally, not all 19
asymmetric relationships end in misperceptions. Furthermore, the intensity of misperception can 
vary. There are ways to prevent or at least alleviate systemic misperception, but in case it does arise, 
it will fit into the pattern of asymmetry theory. 
!
According to Womack, there are two basic techniques for managing an asymmetric bilateral 
relationship. For nations to not get caught up in a concatenation of misunderstanding and 
misperception, they should minimize potential issues leading to misperception and control the 
escalation of misperception.  The challenge of managing an asymmetric bilateral relationship is to 20
establish ways through which both sides have the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the 
situation and the other side’s views. Asymmetry theory seeks to make sense of structural features at 
the root of day-to-day diplomatic interaction. Reinforced day-to-day interaction can lead to 
convergence, and it is therefore an important factor in enhancing mutual understanding and 
breaking the circle of structural misperception. “The common ground of deference and autonomy is 
mutual respect.”  Both sides of an asymmetric relationship need to figure out how to live together. 21
The asymmetric characteristic of an asymmetric relationship does not mean the relationship is 
dysfunctional, but that negotiations should be the point of convergence. Establishing mutual 
understanding and mutual benefit is therefore of core interest for managing an asymmetric 
relationship. 
!
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 Tien-sze Fang, Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China Relations (New Delhi, India: Oxford University 19
Press, 2014), 199.
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!
3 The Emergence of India’s Perception and Misperception 
!
Why do India’s perception and misperception matter for China’s B&R initiative? A matching 
mindset of perceptions and expectations enhances mutual trust, which is arguably a positive factor 
for the general Sino-Indian relations and the B&R especially. Once we understand India’s 
perceptions and misperceptions of China, we can analyze them along with China’s expectations of 
the B&R and India’s prospective engagement in it.  
Perceptions of the countries’ mutual history differ, which leads to misperception and may 
negatively impact future engagements. Knowing and understanding the past is an important tool to 
understand the present.  This paper therefore sees historic memory as an important factor in 22
shaping Indian thinker’s China picture. In addition, perception and misperception formed in the past 
deliver important guidance and become a significant factor in the development of present and future 
views. In other words, they are the starting point for the creation process: “Treating a country like 
an enemy is a good way to create an enemy.”  If misinterpretation of information is the basis of 23
misperception and new information is interpreted on the basis of previous misperception, a vicious 
circle is created, which is difficult for decision-makers to break.  People have a tendency to 24
evaluate new information according to their pre-existing beliefs. New information can be utilized as 
a conformation for the validity of already established pictures. This behavior fuels decision-makers’ 
tendencies to not just evaluate new information based on already existing beliefs, but also to use it 
as conformation of such beliefs and established policies. Alternatives are often prematurely 
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 Vertzberger 1984, 10.22
 Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu, Managing the China challenge: global perspectives (London: Routledge, 2009), 23
242.
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excluded.  Misperception is therefore fueled by decision-makers’ tendencies to funnel new 25
information into their pre-existing picture.  26
Just like Hoo Tiang Boon, scholars often do not distinguish between perception and 
misperception, but only take India’s threat perception into account. The definition of misperception 
is to understand or perceive a situation, an intention, or someone’s behavior incorrectly. It is the 
misinterpretation of information. Robert Jervis identified perception as a variable in analyzing 
international politics and foreign policies. He outlined common forms of misperceptions as 
perceptions of centralization, overestimating one’s importance as influence and target, the influence 
of desire and fears on perception, and cognitive dissonance.  This paper views the use of  the term 27
misperception the way most scholars treat threat perception as the expectation of harm to the assets 
or values of the state. Misperceptions are not limited to threat, but also include other factors, as 
identified by Jervis. The term misperception can therefore give us a broader understanding of 
India’s concerns. 
Although threat perceptions do not always have to be based on incorrect assumptions, 
India’s tendency to over-attention, based on the asymmetric feature of the Sino-Indian relationship, 
increases the possibility of misinterpretation of information, leading to structural misperception of 
China’s intentions, actions and capabilities. The Indian government has remained silent regarding 
its B&R participation, although China formally invited India as early as 2014. Indian politicians 
have mentioned multiple times that their reluctance to participate is based on China’s perceived 
reluctance to provide more information on the B&R. Despite authoritative voices in India 
demanding more information, they remain unwilling to participate in events touching on the subject 
!  15
 Jervis 1976, 181.25
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of the B&R, and do not acknowledge the work-in-progress stage China’s initiative is currently in. 
Thus, while authoritative Indian voices demand for information, only non-authoritative thinkers 
accepted China’s invitation for a B&R summit in May 2017. The Indian government refrained from 
sending a delegation to Beijing, and only members of Indian think tanks attended some meetings.  28
In addition, India criticized China’s initiative and openly warned of unsustainable debt due to the 
B&R. Despite Indian figures having given much of their attention to China’s development project, 
their interpretation of information, or the perceived lack of such, leaves them reluctant to gather 
new information on the matter. In order to underline the theory that India’s misperception can be 
explained through the asymmetry theory, three core causes for India’s China picture will be outlined 
in the following sections: historical memory, day-to-day interaction and economic relationship.  
!
!
3.1 Historical Memory 
!
Modern Sino-Indian relations have had a cooperative and unanimous start. India was one of the first 
countries to acknowledge the One-China policy in the 1950s. The Sino-Indian friendship was 
reflected by the slogan of that time “Indians and Chinese are brothers - Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai”.  29
But with the rising disagreement over Tibet, a natural buffer zone between India and China, the 
rhetoric emphasizing friendship and cooperation was abolished. With the Tibet question weighing 
heavy, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated drastically, resulting in the border war of 1962, which was 
won by China. After the border war, Indian strategic thinkers stopped seeing China as a potential 
!  16
 Sanjeev Miglani, "India skips China's Silk Road summit, warns of 'unsustainable' debt," Reuters, May 14, 2017, 28
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partner, and started seeing their neighbor as a potential rival. Diplomatic relations were cut off until 
1976, and it took even longer for high-level visits to resume.  
The perception that China is India’s major threat and rival has not gone away even 55 years 
after its shaping, and gave the Indian Ministry of Defense reason to present China as India’s most 
potent threat in their annual reports for many years.  In contrast, even after India’s nuclear tests in 30
1998, the justification for which being the perceived threat from China, India was hardly mentioned 
in China’s defense reports.  The lack of concern for India in official Chinese defense statements 31
underlines the asymmetry at the heart of the interaction between these two neighbors. Chinese 
decision-makers’ perception of India as a threat is limited, whereas Indian decision-makers’ fear of 
China is rather enhanced. This asymmetry in attention leads to an asymmetry of misperception. 
With historical memory weighing heavily onto the relationship, it adds another factor for vague 
suspicion transforming into misperception.  32
In the Indian mind, the border war is a historical relic of China’s betrayal of the friendship 
between the nations, and the living memory that China is not shy to show aggression in order to 
occupy India’s territory.  Although since the normalization of the relationship China has repeatedly 33
attempted to reassure India that its intentions are only of a peaceful nature and that China and India 
do not pose a threat to each other, in the eyes of Indian thinkers still, India has suffered from 
China’s expansionism and containment in the past, so it is not unlikely that it will suffer from it 
again in the future. This deep-rooted mistrust – which leads to misinterpretation of information and 
therefore shapes misperception up until today – finds its emerging point in the history of the 1950s 
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and 1960s, which can be seen as the point of departure for the process of shaping misperception. 
Although the normalization process of the relationship has gained effectiveness since the 1980s, 
when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing – the first high-level visit since the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations – the border issue remains unresolved.  
China’s defeat over India and the humiliation India experienced laid the foundation for the 
asymmetric relationship. Before the historical events of the 1950s and 1960s, China and India’s 
engagement with each other was on equal terms. Both nations were similar in size, population, and 
military and economic capacity. Both nations sought leading roles in the world order.  The status 34
quo of the relationship was a balanced one. With China’s triumph over India, the status quo was 
shifted in its favor. India, which perceived a superior status for itself in the international arena due 
to its historically central role in Asia and its geopolitically and geostrategically convenient location, 
incorrectly ascribed itself a high level of power and low level of vulnerability. The credibility of 
India, who desired to be a leader among developing countries, was undermined by the border war.  35
China taught India to fear its neighbor, and that its capacities and capabilities were greater than 
those of India.  Whether or not this was true is of little importance to this paper; what is important 36
is that India perceived it as such. The shift in India’s perceived power status changed its focus, and 
with it its perception and misperception of China. A sharp decline in bilateral relations followed the 
border war, leading to maladaptation, and the gap in understanding between China and India’s 
perceived version of China consequently grew.  
Although the avoidance of confrontation along the border has been for the most part 
successful, the mere maintenance of the issue is not enough to change India’s negative picture of 
!  18
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China. In addition, the possibility of misinterpretation of information and the emerging of 
misperception cannot be minimized. Despite China’s success in settling border issues with its 
neighbors in the past, in the Sino-Indian case China’s negotiation rhetoric has gotten tougher.  In 37
order to improve a relationship based on mutual trust and mutual understanding, the engagement 
with each other needs to be intensified, but who would want to make friends with an aggressor or a 
betrayer? The picture of China as an aggressor and a traitor, shaped by the events of the 1950s and 
1960s, still weighs heavily on the relationship and influences India’s politics towards its neighbor. 
The negative picture of China deriving from the border war of 1962 is unlikely to vanish, since it 
has been translated into an ongoing dispute.  
China’s attempts to counter India have been by far more successful over the past decades 
than vice-versa. Therefore, the created status-quo is in favor of and acceptable for China, but not for 
India. Indian decision-makers’ unrest about the status quo of the bilateral relationship is strongly 
reflected in their policy decisions towards China. But unlike India, China is satisfied with the 
existing status quo and does not see the border dispute as a security threat. “Vulnerability to China 
is positional rather than a result of China’s current behavior or intentions.”  Due to the historic 38
memory of aggression and betrayal, India sees its vulnerability to China in China’s behavior and 
perceived intentions. Jervis points out that “…when others’ actions hurt or threaten the perceiver he 
is apt to overestimate the degree to which the behavior was a product of internal forces and was 
aimed at harming him.”  The influence of historical memory from the events of the 1950s and 39
1960s are reflected in other aspects of India’s perception and misperception. The attention Indian 
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observers give Chinese activities is far greater than the attention Chinese observers give Indian 
activities, which fits into the pattern of smaller state behavior according to the asymmetry theory. 
Three of China’s activities which are the most discomforting to India are the Sino-Pakistan 
friendship, China’s growing influence in the South Asian region and the resulting growing 
cooperation with India’s smaller neighbors, and the expanding Chinese activities in the Indian 
Ocean Region (IOR). To India, both the South Asian region and the greater IOR are understood as a 
traditional sphere of Indian influence. India often understands the Indian Ocean as its natural zone 
of influence, as evidenced by its name. China’s activities in the IOR have been observed and 
commented on closely by Indian observers. Often China’s activities are condemned as a kind of 
encircling. In 2005, a U.S. consulting firm coined the term String of Pearls, which was gladly 
picked up by Indian thinkers and policymakers in order to refer to China’s encircling activities in 
the IOR. China’s activities in the IOR contribute to India’s misperception of an encircling by China 
and a perceived long-term Chinese strategy to undermine India’s traditional position of dominance 
in the IOR.  Although Beijing has openly encouraged smaller South Asian nations to step up 40
against India’s claim of dominance, it refers to its engagement with India’s neighbors as a natural 
development in no way intended to challenge India.  China does provide a lucrative alternative to 41
India’s dominance in South Asia, and the small South Asian nations are therefore often referred to 
as the true beneficiaries of Sino-Indian rivalry in South Asia. In case of the Sino-Pakistan relation, 
India shows twofold wariness, since it also shares a troubled history with Pakistan, which created a 
similar level of mistrust as China.  
All Chinese activities in the IOR, which add to the Indian discomfort, are also, at least to a 
certain degree, subject of the B&R. A negative view of these IOR activities has gained high 
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recognition among Indian thinkers. Information about the B&R is evaluated based on past 
experiences, past activities and past perceptions. Misinterpretation of the B&R activities can easily 
emerge, since new information are evaluated based on past IOR activity-related information. 
Information regarding the B&R has therefore been included in the vicious circle of structural 
misperception. 
!
Once misperception has emerged within a relationship, the smaller state will seek ways of self-
protection, often in the form of establishing new relationships with other larger states, or deepening 
already existing ones. These actions, often understood as counterbalance measurements, will be 
perceived as a threat to the larger state’s distribution of power. In order to gain more leverage 
against China’s spread in South Asia and Asia in general, India has intensified its cooperation with 
other nations, such as the United States, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Through cooperation with Japan as well as South Korea, India was also able to broaden 
its presence in East Asia.  These suggested counterbalance attempts are not appreciated by China, 42
which has a complicated relationship with Japan and the United States and does not want India to 
become too close to these nations. From the Chinese side, India’s engagement with the United 
States, Japan, and the ASEAN is seen as a challenge to the status quo which is satisfying for China. 
At the same time, China is unable to understand India’s similar concerns towards China’s deeper 
economic and strategic engagements with smaller South Asian nations within the Sino-Indian 
nexus. Despite India’s attempts to establish closer cooperation with other non-South Asian nations, 
it is cautious in order to avoid upsetting China. 
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India’s concerns are reflected in its security and foreign policy considerations. In order to avoid a 
too-strong entanglement with China and to discourage China from activities which could harm 
Indian interests, the Indian government implemented countermeasures. These comprised of the 
modernization of India’s military, especially the navy, deepening of a strategic partnership with the 
U.S., and the establishment of the Look East policy. With the Look East policy, India sought new 
economic relations with other Asian nations. Its approach to ASEAN has been especially successful. 
The policy, at first an effort for better economic relations, has achieved more and more cooperation 
in other fields, such as security cooperation. Although China was not the only factor in the decision 
to establish such countermeasures, China accounted for a large part of the reasoning. Growing 
Indian military capabilities and deepening cooperative ties with other nations is nowadays 
understood by Indian policymakers as a way to counterbalance the perceived China threat.  In 43
addition, by implementing more out-reaching policies, India seeks to gain more recognition and 
consolidation for its regional power status. Despite the South Asian region being a region of 
unipolarity, India’s impact as a regional power is restricted due to its limited economic and military 
capabilities. In addition, contrary to the Indian self-understanding of a South Asian natural 
hegemony, this is not universally recognized in the region. Given that India is not satisfied with the 
existing status quo, it can be understood as an attempt to alter the existing status quo and minimize 
Chinese influence in the IOR. Although the extension of its influence is a natural process for a 
nation who desires high recognition by the international community, there is undeniably an aspect 
of rivalry.  
!
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3.2 Day-to-Day Interaction 
!
How does India actually perceive China? A 2016 survey done by Pew Research Center  showed 44
that 31 percent of Indians had a favorable view of China, whereas 36 percent had an unfavorable 
view. But of those 31 percent, only 13 percentage points stated a very favorable view, whereas 22 
percentage points of the 36 percent who had an unfavorable view, stated a very unfavorable view.  45
In a similar survey from 2013 56 percent viewed China’s power and influence as a major threat to 
India, and only 6 percent did not see a threat at all. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that 37 
percent viewed China as an enemy and 21 percent viewed it as a partner.  
Although the Pew survey did not find a generation gap in India’s opinion about China, it 
showed how divided Indians are about their perception of China. Furthermore, a geographical 
divide exists: In India’s northern states, 63 percent of participants saw China as a very serious threat 
while only 36 percent in the east did, and 24 percent in the west. These numbers further underline 
the argument that the historical memory of the border war and the unresolved border issue are a 
major factor in the creation of India’s China picture.  46
!
Another factor causing the great gap of perception and misperception is the lack of mutual 
understanding. India has little engagement with China. Compared to more than 750,000 Indian 
students studying abroad in 2015, the number of 13,500 Indian students studying in China seems 
low. The number of Chinese students visiting an education institute in India is also not very high at 
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only around 2,000. Although the number of 600,000 Indian tourists visiting China in 2012 does not 
seem low, China’s equivalent number does, with only 160,000 out of 100 million Chinese tourists 
who traveled abroad traveling to India. The low level of mutual visits is also reflected in the lack of 
direct flights between China and India. There is only one route, between the capitals Beijing and 
New Delhi. No route has been established yet between the commercial hubs Shanghai and 
Mumbai.   47
These numbers indicate how limited the personal exchange between China and India still is. 
Even more than two decades after the normalization of the Sino-Indian relationship, neither side has 
managed to get to know the other one on a day-to-day, person-to-person basis. India has little first-
hand experience of its largest neighbor. Given there are only a few Indian journalists operating in 
China, India’s information about China relies heavily on third parties, mainly western.  In addition, 48
commentaries about a Sino-Indian competition in the IOR are not just found within India, but are 
also fueled by outside observers. As India often derives its information about China from non-
Chinese sources, the perception of a Sino-Indian rivalry is picked up from these sources and re-used 
to fuel the idea of a rivalry in India.  Furthermore, domestic politics and a competitive media 49
landscape are factors that can contribute to hyping perception and misperception in India. John 
Garver points out that Chinese media systematically downplay India as a threat to China’s security 
interests. Instead, they tend to highlight the successful cooperative elements of Sino-Indian relations 
and try to mention the conflictual elements as little as possible.  Thus, in China, one will fail to 50
find hyping perception and misperception of India. China’s media is government controlled, in 
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contrast with India’s. India’s open media landscape fuels the promotion of perception and even 
stronger misperception of China in India. Comparing elite policy journals for the period 1997-2000, 
Garver found 77 China-focused articles in two Indian journals, but just 19 India-focused articles in 
Chinese journals.  51
 Leaders of both nations are aware of the lack of cultural and person-to-person interaction 
and are determined to encourage more contact between the nations. China and India both 
understand that public diplomacy is a key factor for the establishment of mutual understanding and 
mutual trust. One of the major themes during Prime Minister Modi’s visit China in May 2015 was 
the expansion of more day-to-day interaction. Even though some steps have been taken already, for 
example a youth exchange program between the two neighbors, still there is space for more 
interaction. For example, due to security concerns and disagreement over teaching methods, only 
two Confucius Institutes have been established in India, one in Mumbai and one in  Chennai. None 
of China’s culture and language-promoting facilities can be found in the capital, New Delhi, while 
six Goethe Institutes, the German equivalent, can be found throughout India.  52
China is trying to present itself as a non-threatening and non-revisionist rising power, unlike 
other nations. This peaceful picture China is trying to paint of itself is also strongly reflected in the 
literature coming from Mainland China regarding the B&R.  With its own self-understanding, 53
China is trying to reduce India’s misperception of its actions as directly aimed at limiting India’s 
influence. China views its own actions in the region of South Asia in accordance with the five 
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principles of peaceful coexistence , which India agreed to.  Articles from Chinese sources 54 55
explicitly reject the theory of China as a threat, which is India’s misperception that China’s actions 
are directly and negatively aimed towards them, as a way to keep India’s power and rise in check. 
Furthermore, the China threat theory is solely attributed to India’s feeling of misperception. The 
asymmetry of the relationship is ignored by China, and China does not seek to share India’s 
expectations and concerns, but rather condemns India to suffer from a victim syndrome. 
!
In his book Perception and Misperception, Jervis argues that the roots of many important disputes 
about policies are in differing perceptions, often because the actors misunderstand the situation 
without realizing it. Until these conflicts are solved, many futile debates usually take place. The 
biggest obstacle in these cases is not the conflict per se, but rather the fact that the involved parties 
are at cross purposes.  Due to China’s own understanding of the relationship, it cannot relate to 56
India. Actors are unable to acknowledge that other actors can easily misinterpret their actions, since 
they believe their own behavior is compatible with others interests. An actor’s failure to 
comprehend that their non-hostile intentions may have been interpreted as hostile enhances 
misperception.  China’s own actions towards India are related to the perception that other states’ 57
behavior is comparable to one’s own behavior. China’s actions reflect how it would like to be 
treated if it was in India’s position. Given this fundamental contradiction in behavioral expectations, 
understanding the other side’s incomprehensible actions and concerns is a challenge. This challenge 
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can be overcome if there is willingness and the acknowledgment that the other side’s concerns may 
not reflect one’s own concerns. Due to the nature of an asymmetric relationship, over- and under-
attention play a major role in causing challenges and misperception. Often actors struggle to 
understand that actions which to themselves seem like a natural consequence can easily be 
perceived by others as directly aimed against them.  Even though China understands its own 58
activities as being in line with the five principles of peaceful coexistence and sees them as natural 
behavior of a rising nation, it is unable to comprehend that they appear threatening to India. 
China’s inability to understand India’s concerns is probably best evidenced by the aftermath 
of India’s 1998 nuclear tests. In a letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Vajpayee did 
not directly mention China as the main reason for the nuclear tests, but the references were all too 
clear: “We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state that committed armed 
aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last 
decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem.”  59
China’s commentary was to underline that there are neither Chinese threats to India, nor Indian 
threats to China. India’s justification of nuclear tests by referring to a Chinese threat, was a clear 
example for China of India’s victimization strategy, a way to gain Western sympathy and strengthen 
its hegemonic position in South Asia.  60
In the case of the B&R, both nations seem to have a differing understanding of the 
initiative’s aim. China’s own understanding of the B&R is more geoeconomical than geopolitical. 
Whereas, even though there are Indian thinkers who similarly understand the B&R as 
geoeconomical, the majority of Indian responses are shaped by a geopolitical interpretation of the 
!  27
 Jervis 1976, 354.58
 "Indian's Letter to Clinton On the Nuclear Testing," The New York Times, May 12, 1998, accessed May 20, 2017, 59
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letter-to-clinton-on-the-nuclear-testing.html.
 Garver 2002, 119ff.60
initiative. Since the understanding of the intentions of the B&R differs, it is difficult for China to 
relate to India’s considerations and concerns and eliminate them, and vice-versa. 
 According to asymmetry theory, establishing a common sense of well-established relations 
helps to overcome misperception. Building on mutual respect established through diplomatic rituals 
and common membership in multilateral institutions can help to enhance such well-established 
relations.  Certainly, China and India’s membership in multilateral institutions, such as G-20, 61
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and others, have had a positive effect on the relationship. 
Another example of the merging capabilities of Sino-Indian interests is the multilateral 
development bank Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which India joined as the largest 
shareholder after China.  These engagements give the two rising Asian nations the opportunity to 62
meet on an eye-to-eye level, in circumstances where the status quo of the bilateral relationship is 
rescinded. India and China have started joining their voices in order to demand a bigger saying for 
the developing world. Furthermore, they deepened their cooperation in many fields, which led to an 
increase of government-to-government exchange, as well as a significant increase in bilateral trade. 
The exchange through multilateral institutions has created opportunities to engage with each other, 
deepen their mutual understanding, and minimize their mutual mistrust. These developments might 
move existing perceptions or perceived intentions into a positive direction. It can be of assistance in 
breaking the vicious cycle of structural misperception. Regardless, in the setting of multilateral 
organizations, they are able to acknowledge that their shared identities as rising nations create 
similar demand. In multilateral organizations, China and India are able to see their overlapping 
interests as an opportunity to join their voices together for shared benefit, which they are unable to 
do in the bilateral relationship nexus. 
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3.3 Economic Relationship 
!
When it comes to economic advantage, China and India are able to redirect their focus from 
geopolitics to geoeconomics. India’s general China approach of caution is nevertheless also 
reflected in its economic engagement with its neighbor. However, economic cooperation has been 
the most successful part of the re-engagement so far. With growing trade, more Chinese goods find 
their way into the Indian market, but Indian goods, for the most part, still struggle to gain access to 
the market in China. India represents a lucrative market not just for China, with a rising economy, 
huge and young population, and a growing, middle class eager to spend. 
 With references to the world’s factory and the world’s back-office, China’s President Xi 
Jinping referred to the joint possibilities China’s and India’s industries possess.  With India as a 63
software leader and China as a leading hardware nation, possibilities to get a greater foothold on the 
world market emerge. In 2005, the term Chindia, which describes the capabilities of China and 
India becoming more successful together, experienced a short popularity and was wildly 
discussed.  The term Chindia remained nothing but a catchphrase, however, for multiple reason, 64
such as the restriction of Sino-Indian bilateral ties.  
!
The Sino-Indian trade has experienced an impressive intensification since the late 1980s. Starting 
with only $100 million in 1987, in 2015-‘16 bilateral trade volume reached $71 billion. China and 
India hoped to meet their bilateral trade expectations of $100 billion by 2015, which was not 
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achieved, but remains the target. India seeks China’s financial and infrastructural opportunities, but 
remains wary of them. 
Every mutual visit by high-level leaders brings fruitful results in the economic dimension of 
the relationship. After his latest China visit in 2015, Modi returned home with twenty-four 
agreements worth $10 billion.  Furthermore, the two countries’ cooperation in fields from culture 65
to education, and from exchange to trade and investment was underlined. These positive results 
from high-level visits not only strengthen a win-win cooperation, but also bring mutual trust. 
However, the Sino-Indian relationship is not a balanced relationship, which is reflected in 
the huge trade imbalance. In 2015-‘16 the trade deficit India with China has reached $53 billion. 
Though China is India’s largest trading partner, the same cannot be said for India’s status as a 
trading partner for China. In recent years, India was not even among China’s top ten trading 
partners. India’s exports to China in 2014-‘15 accounted for $12 billion, but imports from China 
made up $60 billion. In January 2017 alone, the export from China to India rose by 18 percent.  66
India runs a trade deficit with most of its trading partners, because its own production does not 
cover the demand of the domestic market. In fact, with other countries, such as Iraq, Switzerland, 
and Australia, the deficit is much greater than with China. But it seems that Indian thinkers give 
more of their attention to the trade imbalance with China than with any other nation. An imbalance 
cannot just be found in the numbers, but also in the quality of exchanged goods. India mainly 
exports raw materials, such as ores, slag, ash, cotton, steel, and copper. China’s catalog of exports to 
India is far more diverse. The major commodities are electronic equipment, machines, engines, and 
technical equipment. As early as 2007, a joint feasibility study about a Free-trade Agreement (FTA) 
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was conducted; nevertheless, a FTA does not seem to be a realistic opportunity in the foreseeable 
future, given India’s reluctance in negotiations.  Whereas Beijing strongly tries to open up new 67
markets, New Delhi seeks to protect its domestic industry.  68
More trade means more opportunities for Chinese goods to enter the Indian market. Many 
suggest that China’s cheap goods help to raise the living standards of the Indian population, but at 
the same time, there are concerns that the Indian manufacturing industry cannot compete with 
China’s. The industry sectors in which India is able to compete globally, namely IT, services, and 
pharmaceuticals, have struggled to enter the Chinese market due to language and tariff barriers. 
Therefore, although the term Chindia, pointing out the complementary nature of China and India, 
theoretically holds some truth, in practice we see little applicability. At the current stage, China 
seeks to enhance its own software sector rather than seeking to merge with India’s already existing 
sector. Similarly, Indian pharmaceuticals have had little success in entering the Chinese market. 
Therefore, the possibility for the two nations to become competitors in complementary sectors is 
higher than the possibility of joining these sectors together. India is wary of the economic 
cooperation further transforming into a competition.  69
 Though recently both sides have improved access to each other’s markets, India’s security 
concerns have been joined by new-found economic concerns. Every fourth anti-dumping case filed 
by India is directed towards China. That makes 147 anti-dumping cases between 1995 and 2011. 
During the same period, China only filed four of these against India.  India’s industry is much 70
more vulnerable to Chinese goods than the Chinese industry is to Indian goods. 
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India is quick to conclude that every negative action by China is a negative action directed towards 
itself. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that India tries to limit China’s access to and 
influence on its market. India would rather limit its own economic prosperity than get too entangled 
with China. For example, Huawei and ZTE, Chinese telecommunication firms, are not able to bid 
for contracts to supply global systems for mobile communication lines in Indian zones of border 
disputes. Indian national security officials expressed their concerns about the possibility that 
Chinese telecom equipment could be infected with malware or used for spying.  Given the 71
historical memory of the Indian border region and the Indian sensitivity towards the disputed area 
it is logically to suggest that new information regarding this area is evaluated through informations 
gained by past experiences. Later on, in the summer of 2008, the Indian government prevented 
Chinese companies from investing in port infrastructure, citing security reasons. Without direct 
proof, Indian decision-makers evaluated China’s intentions in a negative direction.  
Even in economic relations, the two nations have to deal with various challenges such as 
potential competition and the extensive trade deficit. Thus, while there are multiple possibilities for 
more cooperation between the two, as of now, they are not being put into practice due to a 
complicated economy-security nexus. National interests, competition, and the trust deficit between 
New Delhi and Beijing cannot be resolved overnight. As long as the focus of the relationship lies in 
economic engagement, the rhetoric of the relationship is set on win-win cooperation and mutual 
benefit; as soon as the focus is being shifted towards geopolitics, however, the rhetoric changes to a 
zero-sum game mentality. Even though economic cooperation does strengthen the mutual 
understanding and mutual trust in certain fields, at the same time it fuels existing misperception. 
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Although the road to well-established relations is still long, China and India have managed in part 
to shift their focus away from geopolitics and towards the economy. Most of the time, they are able 
and willing to detach their deepening, mainly trade-driven engagement with each other from the 
problems weighing heavily on the relationship. However, even a stronger shift of focus towards 
economics is not able to alleviate India’s misperceptions. Rather, India’s ongoing cautious attitudes 
towards China limit the economic prosperity of the relationship. Economic security concerns are 
shaped by perception and misperception, and these concerns negatively influence policy 
considerations by limiting opportunities. Indian thinkers are wary of the fact that the trade with its 
neighbor is not on equal terms, but strongly favors China. In order to not increase India’s 
vulnerability, Indian decision-makers are not willing to give China access to strategic sectors, since 
it sees security-related implications. India wishes to protect its domestic industry, gain a better 
market share for its competitive industries, and shield against China’s interference into its 
traditional sphere of influence.  This behavior is often characterized as securitization of 72
economics.  As long as India’s security concerns are not acknowledged, addressed, and dealt with, 73
bilateral economic ties will be affected by India’s policies and political considerations. The Sino-
Indian bilateral economic engagement is therefore as fulfilling as the term Chindia suggested, but 
overshadowed by threat, competition, and security perception and misperception. It seems that, in 
many regards, political and security considerations outweigh economic considerations. 
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4 India’s Perception and Misperception of the Belt & Road  
!
Through the B&R, China seeks to offer assistance for infrastructure construction, enhance trade, 
and overcome the barriers holding back Asian connectivity by providing a financing platform.  In 74
the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road, India is mentioned in two out of six outlined economic corridors, which are related to the 
B&R: the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar economic corridor (BCIM) and the China-Pakistan 
economic corridor (CPEC). Both corridors are pre-B&R, but were later included in the initiative. 
The CPEC is currently the most developed of the B&R corridors. 
Formally, India was invited to join the B&R during the 17th round of bilateral border talks 
in February 2014. India remained deliberately silent on the matter, implying its reluctance based on 
lack of details about the initiative. In 2015, India’s Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar 
remarked on the topic of the B&R, “It is their initiative, so I think it is not for us to welcome it or 
not welcome it. It is something which is there on the table. To the best of our knowledge, we have 
not really had a detailed discussion on this subject.”  Lack of information has become a standard 75
justification for India’s silence. India is unable to acknowledge the work-in-progress status of the 
B&R, instead perceiving the information gap as Chinese decision-makers’ strategy to disguise the 
hidden intentions of the initiative. India is not just reluctant to comment on its involvement in the 
B&R, it is also reluctant to join events regarding the B&R. 
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India’s behavior towards China-led developmentalism can be described as ambivalent. On 
the one hand, India actively seeks Chinese investments, while on the other hand, Indian decision-
makers are reluctant to express a clear statement regarding the B&R. At the same time, India is a 
member of the BCIM and strongly rejects the CPEC, since it anticipates activities in areas claimed 
by India. Three options for India regarding the B&R can be outlined. India could choose not to 
engage with the B&R in any way. This would mean it would neither participate in it nor criticize it, 
and remain silent on B&R activities in any regard. Secondly, India could become an active 
stakeholder of the initiative. Thirdly, India could openly oppose the B&R, not just by not becoming 
a member, but also by openly criticizing it and trying to prevent Chinese B&R activities in the 
IOR.  Currently, there are voices coming from India favoring all of the above-mentioned options. 76
In addition, all three options reflect different considerations and are influenced by different 
perceptions and misperceptions. These considerations can be divided into two main aspects: 
Geopolitics and geoeconomics which are in juxtaposition of India’s policymakers’ B&R 
considerations. Both considerations draw from different points of departure. Whereas for the 
geopolitical considerations the point of departure is the events of the 1950s and 1960s, for 
geoeconomic considerations it is the rising economic cooperation of the 2000s. Both considerations 
are reflected in India’s attitudes and responses to China-led developmentalism.  
!
!
!
!
!
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4.1 Geoeconomic Considerations 
!
Geoeconomic considerations concentrate on the support the B&R offers to its stakeholders, which 
is much-needed especially in the Indian infrastructure sector. It is shaped by a neoliberal viewpoint 
through which it understands China’s B&R discourse as resembling of India’s own narrative. Since 
the point of departure for geoeconomic perceptions can be found in the growing economic 
development of the bilateral relationship of the 2000s, geoeconomic considerations can draw from 
positive experiences. This positive perception is shaped by the understanding of Indian B&R 
membership as an opportunity, just like the growing economic ties had an aspect of opportunity to 
them. Furthermore, this perception is shaped by the understanding that, in case India decided to 
distance itself from accepting China’s offer, it could position itself as an outsider in South Asia. 
Which, in addition, could be perceived as standing on the wrong side of China. Not becoming a part 
of the B&R is seen as more harmful to India’s own narrative than becoming a member would be. 
Those who have a proclivity for focusing on the geoeconomic dimension are highly receptive to the 
possibilities inherent in the B&R as they are understood to be coincidental to India’s own regional 
narrative. Globalization trends will inevitably lead to the emerging of new economic centers of 
power in Asia. China’s B&R aspiration reflects these trends of globalization.  By opposing the 77
B&R, India would deny itself the opportunity to become an integrated part of the new economic 
centers of power. Policymakers concentrating on geoeconomic considerations view geopolitical 
security considerations regarding the B&R as restrictive to  India’s development.  
Policymakers favoring Indian participation in the B&R oppose Indian security 
considerations, because they understand them as hindering potential benefit. To them, the 
geoeconomic focus is more important than the geopolitical. Due to historical memory, especially 
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the continuing effect of the loss experienced in the 1962 border war, the Indian identity is haunted 
by a feeling of losing a competition against China. This sense of losing an important match is still 
present in many Indian thinkers, and by extension in the economic nexus of the relationship. 
Observers favoring geoeconomics perceive the B&R as an opportunity to not lose another important 
match, but instead to catch up with the neighbors’ development and alter the existing status quo 
with the help of China-led developmentalism.  78
!
In 1999 India, along with Bangladesh, Myanmar and China, joined the Kunming Initiative, which 
was initially a Track II initiative aimed at enhancing trade and investment between structurally 
weak regions of the four nations. Later, the Kunming Initiative was renamed to the Bangladesh-
China-India-Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation. While the other participants moved on to a 
Track I level, India was reluctant to do so, pointing to security considerations. Although China 
showed the ambition to make fast progress in regional cooperation, for over a decade the promoted 
trade and connectivity remained only on paper. India’s long-standing caution towards engaging with 
China, as well as towards opening up the unstable northeast region, hindered fast progress. Due to 
the asymmetry of the relationship, India’s vulnerability to China is greater than vice-versa, and this 
gave India reason to be reluctant to engage further with China. The call for security concerns and 
the fragility of the Indian industry in the face of a flood of Chinese goods therefore became India’s 
classic justification. Security considerations regarding China restrained Indian decision-makers’ 
enthusiasm and further restrained them from engaging too deeply in a China-led regional 
association. 
Thus, while since May 2013 the BCIM experienced a revival, and India still acknowledges 
its membership, the pace of the cooperation process has been slowed by Indian security 
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considerations.  Although the BCIM is a pre-B&R project, it has been included in the initiative 79
retrospectively. Indian thinkers endorsing India as a stakeholder of the B&R are concerned that 
security considerations would hinder progress India could make through the B&R, just as the 
prospects of the BCIM have been hindered in the past. Perceptions cannot be overcome 
instantaneously. The longer perceptions exist, the more highly resistant to change they are.  In the 80
economic nexus, India can look back on a development leading to a more positive China picture, 
but despite this, the rigidity of the long-time picture of China as a threat still exists among Indian 
decision-makers. Although in the geoeconomic realm we see a positive adaptation of perception for 
the BCIM case, the geoeconomic prospect was not able to overcome Indian decision-makers’ 
China-related security concerns.  
!
In 2015, the Modi government approved the Sagarmala project, which aims at port-led development 
along the coastlines. The Indian government realized that the nation’s underdeveloped and partly 
non-existing ports and waterways pose considerable economic loss. Much like the B&R, India’s 
Sagarmala project aims at connectivity, coastal community development, and port-led 
industrialization.  The two developmental initiatives could merge in certain areas and together 81
bring greater connectivity for India and South Asia in general. For years, India has been seeking 
more and more foreign investment, including Chinese investment. Since India is already seeking 
Chinese investment, and also has overlapping aims and projects, it seems inconsistent to oppose the 
support offered by the B&R. 
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The possible benefits of the B&R for India can be found especially in the development of 
the Kolkata port and in strengthening the underdeveloped northeastern region. China would be able 
to gain an alternative route to the Strait of Malacca, which is currently seen as a dangerous 
transportation bottleneck. It would be a cooperation of mutual benefit, entirely in the spirit of the 
B&R initiative. Although the opportunities created by Chinese assistance, especially in the port and 
train infrastructure sector, are acknowledged by scholars focusing on the geoeconomical arguments, 
India’s own responsibility to reduce state capacity constraints should not be neglected. While the 
geoeconomic focus understands the importance of connectivity as such, it also understands that 
connectivity has to expand gradually. India still faces great state constraints, with internal 
development not being completed. For a large part, the hinterland’s connectivity with India’s ports 
still has to be structured. While the B&R poses potential benefit for India therefore, India’s capacity 
constraints could reverse these benefits. To a great extent, India has not managed to make its 
industrial hubs available to South Asia. South Asia’s connectivity is among the lowest in the 
world.  Intra-South Asian infrastructure would underline India’s presence in the region, and in 82
addition, by making its own industrial hubs available to the region, India would create benefits in 
economic terms. Therefore, policymakers point out that India needs to continue to complete its 
internal development, before the external opportunities posed by China can be explored to the 
fullest point. Although the benefits to economic prosperity are unquestioned, strategic 
considerations remain. At the current stage, the geoeconomic community also acknowledges that 
China’s superiority and India’s state capacity restrictions have to be taken into account in order for 
India to turn the B&R to its advantage. Indian thinkers also point out that China should not be 
India’s only option for overcoming state constraints, and it should seek to leave options open for 
cooperation with other nations and initiatives. In addition, India’s geoeconomic considerations are 
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also reflected in the question of which role India would play in the B&R. India seeks to alter the 
existing status quo of the relationship, and is therefore not willing to be a junior partner to China but 
seeks to be met at eye level by its dominant neighbor. Although the B&R is understood as an 
opportunity for greater trade and cooperation, geoeconomic considerations do see constraints as 
well, and are reflected in India’s general caution towards China.  
!
!
4.2 Geopolitical Considerations  
!
In contrast to the geoeconomic understanding of the B&R are the geopolitical considerations. 
Mainstream B&R comments found in Indian media, from scholars as well as politicians, are often 
influenced by geopolitical considerations. They can be broken down into three subcategories. 
Firstly, the B&R is seen as an attempt to reorder Asia and undermine American alliances in South 
Asia. In this view, India is advised to avoid depending too heavily on a single political-economic 
community. If India would decide to become a part of the B&R, it should not close the door to U.S. 
cooperation and create a too-heavy dependence on China.  83
Secondly, considerations are shaped by strategic caution and concerns regarding China’s 
hidden intentions. The economic appeal of the initiative is perceived to disguise greater security-
related implications. Indian scholars have pointed out that “Reading the Chinese press would have 
us think that the OBOR , one of President Xi Jinping’s key initiatives, is aimed only at economic 84
rebalancing and at building friendly relationships with China’s neighborhood, with no grander 
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geopolitical objective.”  Comments like the above can be found frequently within the Indian B&R 85
discussion. Uncertainty is a common factor for misperception, since there is a tendency among 
decision-makers to search for alternative meanings of the given information and assign an 
ambiguity to the information even if there is no hint of such.  Indian observers fear that China’s 86
attempt to construct greater port infrastructure in South Asia is really an attempt to gain military 
strength in the Indian Ocean. The four projects contributing most to India’s discomfort are the 
harbor of Gwadar in Pakistan in particular, and harbor projects in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and 
Myanmar in general. All of these projects are pre-B&R, but were later included in the project. In 
this regard, Indian observers perceive the B&R as an updated, more institutionalized version of the 
String of Pearls, which has fueled India’s China concerns for years. “Undeniably, China is seeking 
access facilities in the Indian Ocean, whether known by the String of Pearls nomenclature, or 
fructified through the MSR Concept.”  Indian observers strongly assume that China seeks to 87
establish military bases in the IOR by funding commercial ports, which later could be utilized for 
the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).  Chinese commercial port activities are perceived to 88
be military activities in disguise. For Indian analysts, the possibility that the Chinese Navy has no 
greater interest in the IOR is unrealistic, since in their understanding the IOR is of profound 
strategic interest – despite Beijing underlining that it has no maritime military strategy for the IOR. 
Indian observers pay close attention to Chinese military activity in general and in the IOR in 
particular. The paucity of IOR mentions within Chinese military strategy papers, such as the 
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Chinese Defence White Papers, causes Indian thinkers to strongly assume that China holds interests 
in a growing PLAN representation in the IOR.  The paucity of information is used as an argument 89
for the suggestion that commercial Chinese activities in the IOR are just disguised military strategy. 
The B&R, especially the MSR activities, which according to China have no greater military 
intention, are no exception to these perceptions. 
In addition, China does participate in joint exercises for counterterrorism, shipping safety, 
and seafarers, as well as general maritime security, also in the IOR. These activities further add to 
India’s reservations regarding Chinese IOR intentions, since they are also perceived to be an 
attempt to increase Chinese military strategic positioning. The naming of such exercises, for 
example a joint counterterrorism exercise in 2015 in cooperation with Sri Lanka called Silk Road 
Cooperation - 2015, enhances Indian perception about hidden military intentions within Silk Road 
activities.  People often overestimate the degree of their centrality to others’ considerations.  In 90 91
this case, India seems to overestimate the geostrategic importance of the IOR to the PLAN, since 
there is no concrete evidence for the Indian assumption of China’s greater strategic military interest 
in the region. In addition, India fails to see the obvious military disadvantage for China in the IOR, 
namely its distance from it. Establishing military bases in the IOR at this point would be 
overstretching the PLAN.  As mentioned earlier, misperception is the gap between the objective 92
environment and the person’s subjective understanding of that environment. Despite military 
facilitation not being an element of the B&R, Indian observers nevertheless correlate the B&R with 
Chinese military intentions. The objective environment of the B&R is that it does not foresee any 
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military activities, however, Indian observers’ subjective understanding is that Chinese activities in 
the IOR have a military component. These assumed military activities are furthermore perceived as 
directed towards India. Here we see a gap between the reality of the B&R and the Indian perception 
of the B&R. India assimilates information about the B&R into its pre-existing belief of any Chinese 
activities in the IOR, such as the String of Pearls. Collected misinterpretation, misjudgment, and 
wrong conclusions can easily be carried throughout the process of information processing with 
implications for the overall outcome. Often, the information obtained is re-entered into the 
information processing of related events.  The understanding of Chinese pre-B&R activities in 93
India’s traditional sphere of influence as an encirclement and therefore a threat has been included in 
the evaluation of Chinese B&R activities in the region. The interpretation and judgment of China’s 
activities as a threat and encirclement is re-used for the B&R information process and shapes the 
understanding of the initiative.  
The third subcategory of geopolitical B&R considerations is the concern that a stronger 
Chinese presence at India’s north, east, south, and west diminishes India’s geographic advantage. 
India sees the establishment of a more fine-mesh Chinese network in its immediate neighborhood as 
diminishing its traditional advantages, which are based on its central geographic location. Of India’s 
neighbors, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have already ensured their participation in the 
B&R.  China is trying to strengthen interconnectivity in South Asia. India has a historical memory 94
of losing a natural strategic buffer zone, Tibet, to China. The newly developed growing ties with 
China and South Asia reactivate negative sentiments shaped by the historical memory of the 1960s. 
In addition, through the growing China presence in the region, India’s smaller neighboring nations 
have discovered their hedging capabilities by playing the China card. The reinforcement of China’s 
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sphere of influence within India’s traditional geostrategic frontier could further lead the small South 
Asian countries to pit China against India and vice-versa.  Fears of India’s regional ambitions 95
being bypassed by China are strong. In order to contain China’s growing dominance in India’s 
perceived backyard, amplified by the B&R, India is scaling up its own engagement in the region. 
While it remained cautious of China’s developmental proposals, India was busy establishing its own 
projects. The Mausam Project and the Spice Route are attempts to revive India’s own ancient trade 
routes in order to regain linkages with countries in the IOR. Both projects are openly understood as 
counter-measures, not just for China’s B&R, but to undermine the growing Chinese presence in the 
IOR in general.  In addition, they can be seen as an attempt to challenge the existing asymmetric 96
status quo. While China has shown interest in linking India’s projects with the B&R, given India’s 
unwillingness to join the B&R in general it seems highly unlikely that the Modi government will be 
willing to merge their most significant foreign policy initiative with China’s. Modi distinguishes 
between two types of projects: “There are projects we will pursue individually. There are few such 
as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor that we are doing jointly.”  Although India is 97
openly committed to the BCIM, it does not recognize the encapsulation of the economic corridor by 
the B&R. Foreign Secretary Jaishankar stated that, “In the case of BCIM corridor, my recollection 
is that our understanding to work together on this corridor predates this One Belt, One Road. 
Whether someone thereafter moves it from this file to that file is their internal business. As far as 
we are concerned, we have a commitment which, if my memory serves me right, we made when 
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Premier Li Keqiang went to India.”  India understands the BCIM as an independent project, 98
whereas China understands it as part of the interests of the B&R.  
In addition to the concern about opening up the unstable northeastern Indian region, raised 
within the BCIM cooperation, the B&R leads to concerns regarding granting Chinese companies 
access to infrastructure and port hubs in the country. Given the BCIM Track II approach and focus 
on peripheral regions, the sub-regional development of the BCIM has been marginalized by the 
inclusion in the B&R.  India does not acknowledge the BCIM as part of the B&R. By being China-99
cautious, India did not just hinder progress in the inter-Asia connectivity of remoter, structurally 
weak regions, but now puts a project attempting to bolster peripheral regions itself into the 
periphery by not allowing it to become part of a greater initiative encouraging connectivity.  As of 100
now, India has underlined its commitment to the BCIM, strongly opposed the CPEC, and 
maintained silence on the B&R initiative as such.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, security 101
considerations also hindered fast evolving cooperation through the BCIM. There already, Indian 
observers repeatedly pointed to concerns regarding the opening up of the underdeveloped 
northeastern region, and giving Chinese companies access to infrastructure and port hubs.   
!
Despite China’s efforts of pointing to the economic and connectivity focus of the B&R, Indian 
observers often understand connectivity as just another word for geopolitics. India’s Foreign 
Secretary, for example, regarded connectivity as having “emerged as a theater of present day 
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geopolitics.”  Whenever China says connectivity, India understands geopolitics. Even though at 102
the beginning of the 2000s China and India discovered the economical appeal of cooperation, the 
focus of the Sino-Indian relations have been gradually shifted back to geopolitics. 
India and China share the identity of a rising nation, which, contrary to the expected, 
intensifies misperception in the form of rivalry and threat. China and India both seek to gain global 
power status and enlarge their influence in international and regional affairs. China’s B&R, but also 
India-led developmentalism can be understood as part of the quest for gaining status. In recent 
history, China has been more successful in obtaining status. The sense of losing another race in the 
competition for status, which causes Indian thinkers - who focus on geoeconomics - to be in favor 
of participating in the B&R, can be seen as justification for geopolitically-focused thinkers to 
oppose it. By joining the B&R and submitting to Chinese superiority, India would lose another 
important race for status. In addition, Indian observers have pointed out the salient lack of regional 
associations in the B&R which do not include China. To them, this directly translates into a Chinese 
unwillingness to engage with associations in which China’s influence is limited or non-existing.  103
To India, a key member in several regional associations, this reflects the Chinese government’s 
quest of superiority within the B&R, despite their efforts to underline the initiative’s open and 
inclusive features. In a propaganda video published by The China Daily on YouTube in May 2017, 
it is explained that the B&R is “China’s idea, but it belongs to the world.”  Indian observers have 104
raised concerns regarding a superior stance from China within the initiative. Despite the inclusive 
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nature of the B&R being explicitly highlighted, China’s dominant position within the initiative 
cannot be denied.  
All of the above-mentioned security concerns translate into actual strategic implications 
regarding India’s B&R approach. In May 2017, India did not send a delegation of government 
officials to attend the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. An Indian foreign ministry spokesperson 
stated, “No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial 
integrity”.  India is especially troubled about the CPEC, which anticipates activities in sensitive 105
areas, and used it also as a justification for its absence. In general, Indian considerations shaped by 
geopolitics oppose India’s participation in the B&R, or at least urge it to keep other options open 
too. 
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 5 Conclusion 
!
This paper aimed at two interrelated objectives. First, it presented the shaping of India’s perception 
and misperception through the asymmetry theory. Secondly, it related the insights to India’s 
behavior towards China-led developmentalism, in the form of the B&R. This paper has examined 
China and India’s relationship within the scope of China-led developmentalism. It has been shown 
that India’s reluctance to be part of China’s initiative is rooted in mistrust, misinterpretations of 
information, and the lack of information. Ever since the deterioration of the Sino-Indian 
relationship, due to the border war, India has established a deep-rooted distrust of China. Based on 
this distrust, new information regarding China is evaluated in a prejudiced way. The emerging of 
misperception is therefore likely. The asymmetric relationship between the countries amplifies the 
misinterpretation of information due to the vast difference in attention span. Due to the asymmetric 
nature of the Sino-Indian relationship, India remains more exposed to China, which leads to 
ambivalence in India’s China strategy. India remains cautious of risks as well as open to 
opportunities. In addition, differences in the nations’ behavior can contribute to misinterpretation of 
information, which can lead to a vicious circle of misinterpretation and therefore misperception. 
Competition and cooperation are the two dominant modes of behavior among major powers 
in the economic and security dimension. While China and India have managed to work together in 
certain situations, such as joining their voices together in multilateral organizations, on other 
occasions they still appear as strong competitors. The competition and cooperation nexus of the 
bilateral relationship is also part of India’s B&R considerations. As shown above, India’s B&R 
reactions are cautious and ambivalent. Its reactions are strongly linked to two different main 
considerations, geoeconomics and geopolitics, which are influenced by perceptions and 
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misperceptions India has gained through past experience, and are further shaped by the  day-to-day 
engagement with China, which is often lacking. As shown by the asymmetry theory, past 
experience, which shifted the balance of the relationship, gave reasons for Indian over-attention. 
Furthermore, since India’s vulnerability to China is greater than vice-versa, the asymmetry in the 
relationship is the reason for the asymmetry of the attention span. India, as the weaker participant of 
the relationship, gives much more attention to Chinese activities. Any activity, whether it is 
establishing commercial ports in the IOR, or measurements for counterterrorism, is perceived as 
directed against India. The lack of mutual understanding, partly explainable through the lack of 
day-to-day interaction, can therefore be another dominant factor for the emerging of misperception.  
Although India is interested in cooperation with China and other countries, it only proceeds 
with it if their national interests align with those of other countries. Therefore India evaluates its 
membership on a case-by-case basis.  In the case of the B&R, national interests motivated by 106
geoeconomic considerations are outweighed by geopolitical considerations. Often these geopolitical 
considerations are interpreted by means of conclusions draw from past experiences. Perceptions do 
not change overnight. Security concerns regarding China are heavily influenced by past experience, 
and even if the border dispute, which still weighs heavily on the relationship, would be settled, 
China’s negative picture in India will not change immediately. However, settling the border dispute 
would be a first step in resolving the emerging structural misperception. Giving closure to the 
perceived Indian humiliation of the 1962 border war would help to break through the circle of 
misinterpretation and misperception, and help shift the focus towards their cooperation 
opportunities. 
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Since, on the one hand, India does seek Chinese investment, and joins and opposes Chinese-
led projects on a case-by-case basis, reactions regarding the B&R coming from India are 
ambivalent. India’s B&R picture is not just tainted by security considerations which are influenced 
by past experiences, lack of day-to-day interaction, and unrest with the existing status quo, but also 
by the uncertainty of China’s utilization of its growing influence. In addition, India is unable to 
acknowledge the work-in progress characteristic of the initiative. At the same time, China is unable 
to acknowledge the concerns coming from the Indian B&R discourse, and update on information 
regarding those concerns. Political rhetoric should be backed by action. It is true that planning and 
preparing for the worst-case scenario might carry the seeds of self-fulfilling prophecies.  At the 107
same time, China does not give India the benefit of the doubt, but rather views India’s behavior as 
the result of a victim syndrome. Both considerations, geopolitics as well as geoeconomics, mirror 
China’s paucity of information regarding the B&R. Furthermore, they reflect China’s shortcomings 
in eliminating skepticism put forward by other countries. China needs to work on its line of 
argumentation and needs to realize that its interests can be perceived by others as directed against 
them. China’s political management is failing on alleviating security concerns, as other nations have 
shown,  and economic prosperity alone will not help to erase them. 108
!
India has been using an information gap as justification for its silence on the B&R matter. 
While the B&R’s vagueness should be understood as a feature of its work-in-progress status, India 
understands it as China disguising its true intentions. Where China sees geoeconomical prosperity, 
India often perceives geopolitical menace. Often Indian decision-makers understand the initiative’s 
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vagueness as a weakness, even as a possible threat. They fail to see it as an opportunity for 
members to modify the B&R in their favor. It would be in India’s strategic interest to give up its 
observational stance and start becoming an active co-creator of the B&R project. Unlike the 
Marshall Plan, which  the B&R is often compared to, is not a fixed plan, but a work in progress. 
Therefore, India’s sit and wait strategy is counterproductive. While India demands more 
information, it is missing the opportunity to become the shaper of these new insights to the B&R. 
India’s attention on geopolitics is out of proportion, which is explainable through the asymmetry of 
the relationship; however, while India can stay dissatisfied about the status quo, by simply trying to 
avoid any engagement with China it will not alter it. India expects an operational blueprint, but 
neglects the opportunity to co-create one jointly with China. Although Indian analysts demand to be 
engaged in the designing and implementation process of the B&R, they have neglected any 
opportunity presented to them so far. India needs to be aware that its decision regarding the B&R 
has implication for future relations with China. As pointed out by strategic thinkers focusing on the 
geoeconomic nexus of the initiative, India’s opposition to the B&R could be perceived as India 
opposing China-led developmentalism. Not just Sino-Indian relations are constrained by the 
asymmetry of the relationship and the emerging of misperception, but furthermore it limits Indian 
decision-makers’ willingness to become a stakeholder in the B&R. It seems that, India is only able 
to become a stakeholder of the B&R if it can separate its geopolitical concerns from its 
geoeconomic perceptions. 
!
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